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ABSTRACT
Government healthcare expenditures have been growing much more rapidly than GDP in
OECD countries. For example, between 1970 and 2002 these expenditures grew 2.3 times faster than
GDP in the U.S., 2.0 times faster than GDP in Germany, and 1.4 times faster than GDP in Japan.
How much of government healthcare expenditure growth is due to demographic change and
how much is due to increases in benefit levels; i.e., in healthcare expenditures per beneficiary at a
given age? This paper answers this question for ten OECD countries -- Australia, Austria, Canada,
Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the U.S. Specifically, the paper decomposes
the 1970  ￿ 2002 growth in each countrys healthcare expenditures into growth in benefit levels and
changes in demographics. 
Growth in real benefit levels has been remarkably high and explains the lions share  ￿ 89
percent  ￿ of overall healthcare spending growth in the ten countries. Norway, Spain, and the U.S.
recorded the highest annual benefit growth rates. Norways rate averaged 5.04 percent per year. Spain
and the U.S. were close behind with rates of 4.63 percent and 4.61 percent, respectively. 
Allowing benefit levels to continue to grow at historic rates is fraught with danger given the
impending retirement of the baby boom generation. In Japan, for example, maintaining its 1970-2002
benefit growth rate of 3.57 percent for the next 40 years and letting benefits grow thereafter only
with labor productivity entails present value healthcare expenditures close to 12 percent of the
present value of GDP. By comparison, Japans government is now spending only 6.7 percent of
Japans current output on healthcare. 
In the U.S., government healthcare spending now totals 6.6 percent of GDP. But if the U.S.
lets benefits grow for the next four decades at past rates, it will end up spending almost 18 percent
of its future GDP on healthcare. The difference between the Japanese 12 percent and U.S. 18 percent
figures is remarkable given that Japan is already much older than the U.S. and will age more rapidly
in the coming decades. 
Although healthcare spending is growing at unsustainable rates in most, if not all, OECD
countries, the U.S. appears least able to control its benefit growth due to the nature of its fee-for-
service healthcare payment system. Consequently, the U.S. may well be in the worst long-term fiscal
shape of any OECD country even though it is now and will remain very young compared to the
majority of its fellow OECD members.
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I.  Introduction 
As is well know, government healthcare expenditures in developed countries have 
been growing much more rapidly than have their economies.  What is less well known is how 
much of this expenditure growth is due to demographic change and how much is due to 
increases in benefit levels, i.e. health expenditures per person at a given age.
1  The distinction 
is important.  Benefit levels are determined by government policy, whereas demographics are 
largely outside government control.  Policymakers who ignore or misjudge the growth in 
their benefit levels do so at their county’s risk.  They are left with only a vague understanding 
of why their health expenditures grew in the past and very little ability to project how they 
will grow in the future. 
This study uses OECD demographic and total health expenditure data in conjunction 
with country-specific age-health expenditure profiles to measure growth in real healthcare 
benefit levels between 1970 and 2002 in ten OECD countries -- Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Germany,  Japan,  Norway,  Spain,  Sweden,  the  UK,  and  the  U.S.    Among  these  nations, 
Norway, Spain, and the U.S. recorded the highest growth rates in benefit levels.  Norway’s 
rate averaged 5.04 percent per year.  Spain and the U.S. were close behind with rates of 4.63 
percent and 4.61 percent, respectively.  Canada and Sweden had the lowest growth rates -- 
2.32 percent and 2.35 percent, respectively. 
Benefit growth, even among countries with the lowest benefit growth rates, has played 
the major role in raising total government healthcare spending in recent decades.  Over the 
32-year period covered by our data, total healthcare spending grew 2.5 times faster than 
GDP, on average, across the ten countries.
2  Had there been no benefit growth, healthcare 
                                                
1Breyer and Ulrich (2000) and Seshamani and Gray (2003) examine growth of health expenditures in Germany, 
Japan, and the UK.  
2 This 1.8 factor is obtained by averaging the ten country-specific ratios of A to B, where A is the 1970-2002 
growth rate of real healthcare expenditures and B is the 1970-2002 growth rate of real GDP.   2 
spending would still have grown because of demographics, specifically changes in the age-
composition of healthcare beneficiaries and increases in the total number of beneficiaries.  
But with no benefit growth, healthcare spending in our ten countries would have grown, on 
average, only one fifth as fast. 
Going  forward,  benefit  growth  will  continue  to  play  the  key  role  in  determining 
overall increases in healthcare spending.  In 2002 the share of the population 65 and older in 
our ten countries averaged 14.8 percent.  By mid century it will average 25.9 percent – a 75 
percent increase.  Table 1 shows how the population share of the elderly will change in our 
ten countries through 2070.  Japan, which is currently the oldest of our countries, will retain 
that ranking, ending up in 2070 with 37.7 percent of its population age 65 or older.  The U.S.  
will also retain its ranking as the youngest of the ten countries.  Its 2070 elderly share is 
projected at 21.6 percent –not much greater than the current elderly share of the Japanese 
population.  
Since healthcare benefit levels are much higher for the elderly than they are for the 
young, continuing to let benefit levels grow as a country ages will accelerate the increase in 
healthcare  spending.    In  the  U.S.,  for  example,  real  government  healthcare  spending 
increased by a factor of 6.9 between 1970 and 2002.  If real benefit levels continue to grow at 
historic rates, real U.S. healthcare spending will increase by a factor of 7.5 over the next 32 
years.  Absent past benefit growth, the U.S. total real healthcare expenditures growth factor 
would have been 1.6 between 1970 and 2002.  And absent future benefit growth, the factor 
will be 1.8 over the next 32 years.  So demographics matter to overall healthcare spending, 
but they are swamped in importance by benefit growth.    
In Japan maintaining its 1970-2002 annual real benefit growth rate of 3.57 percent for 
the  next  40  years  and  at  the  rate  of  labor  productivity  thereafter  entails  present  value 
healthcare expenditures totaling almost 12 percent of the present value of all future GDP.  By   3 
comparison, Japan’s government is now spending only 6.7 percent of the nation’s output on 
healthcare.  In the U.S., government healthcare spending now totals about 6.6 percent of 
GDP.  But if it continues to let benefits grow for the next four decades at past rates, it will 
end up spending almost 18 percent of its future GDP on healthcare.   
The  difference  between  the  Japanese  12  percent  and  U.S.  18  percent  figures  is 
remarkable given that Japan is already much older than the U.S. and will age much more 
rapidly in the coming decades.  The difference accentuates the obvious -- excessive growth in 
benefit levels can be much more important than aging in determining long-term healthcare 
costs.  Moreover, the fact that the present value of projected U.S. healthcare expenditures is 
so high – indeed, the highest of any of our 10 countries when measured relative to GDP – 
suggests that the U.S. may be in the worst overall fiscal shape of any of the OECD countries 
even though its demographics are among the most favorable. 
The paper proceeds by describing our methodology, presenting our data, discussing 
our findings, examining their long-term fiscal implications, and reiterating the importance of 
controlling growth in benefit levels. 
 
II.  Methodology  
Let  t E  stand for the value of real healthcare expenditures in a country in year t and 
write  
(1)     , , t i t i t e E = R ￿ , 
where , i t e   indicates  healthcare  expenditures  per  head  of  age  group  i  at  time  t  and  , i t R  
represents the population age i at time t.  OECD (2004a) provides past population counts for 
the age groups 0-14, 15-19, 20-49, 50-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, and 80 plus.  The subscript i 
references these age groups.    4 
We assume the profile of age-specific health spending is constant through time and 
normalize the age-profile of average expenditures by dividing by average expenditures of age 
group 50-64 in year t.   This defines: 
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In  what  follows  we  treat  absolute  average  real  expenditures  of  age  group  50-64  as  the 
country’s benefit level.  Letting b stand for the base year, 1970, and assuming benefit levels 
grow at a constant annual rate, we have  
(3)   
b t
b t
-
- - + = ) 1 ( , 64 50 , 64 50 l e e  
Use (2) and (3) to rewrite (1) as 
 (4)    it i i
b t
b t P E a l e S + =
-
- ) 1 ( , 64 50  
Note that in the base year, t=b, so given the value of base-year aggregate healthcare spending 
(Eb), knowledge of the age-health expenditure profile (the ￿is), and the base year age-specific 
population counts (the Pits), we can use (4) to determine b , 64 50- e .  Setting t=2002 in (4), we 
can determine the value forl . 
Alternatively, if aggregate healthcare expenditures are measured with error, we can 
take logarithms of both sides of (4) to arrive at (5),  
(5)    t b it i i
m
t b t P E n l e a + + - + = S - - ) 1 ln( ) ( ln ) ln( ln , 64 50 , 
where ￿t stands for a measurement error and 
m
t E stands for measured aggregate healthcare 
expenditures.  By estimating (5) we can recover estimates of  b , 64 50- e  as well as ￿.  Given a 
value  of  l   for  each  country  we  can  accomplish  our  paper’s  first  two  goals,  namely   5 
comparing benefit growth rates across countries and decomposed total healthcare expenditure 
growth into the part due to benefit growth and the part due to demographics. 
The recovered values of  l  are also used to meet our third objective – projecting 
future  aggregate  government  healthcare  spending  in  the  ten  countries.    In  forming  these 
projections we a) utilize Bonin’s (2001) demographic program, which projects population by 
single age,
3 and b) use (4) to determine future values of Et.  In using (4), we a) take the base 
year b to be 2002, b) treat age group i as representing a single age of life, rather than as an 
age  range,  c)  determine  the  value  for 2002 , 64 50- e   by  setting  t=b=2002,  and  treat  E2002  as 
measured with no error.  Where sex- as well as age-specific relative healthcare expenditure 
profiles are available we also distinguish the age groups by sex. This is the case for Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Germany, Norway and the U.S. 
We  summarize  the  size  of  each  country’s  projected  future  aggregate  healthcare 
expenditures by comparing its present value with the country’s present value of GDP, with 
both present values measured over the infinite horizon.  In projecting GDP we assume that 
real per capita GDP grows in the future at the average rate observed in each country over our 
sample period -- 1970 through 2002.
4  In forming present values of both future healthcare 
spending and future GDP, we consider real discount rates of 3, 5, and 7 percent.  
Unfortunately, we have only limited and recent data on healthcare expenditures by 
age for the ten countries.  Hence, we are not in a position to investigate fully the extent to 
which healthcare expenditure profiles have changed through time and are likely to change in 
the future.  If improvements in medical treatments and outcomes make the age-healthcare 
expenditure  profile  steepen  over  time,  the  overall  benefit  growth  rate  we  calculate  will 
                                                
3 Bonin’s  (2001)  projection  program  is  based  on  the  component  method  proposed  by  Leslie  (1945).  The 
standard procedure has been extended to distinguish between genders and to incorporate immigration.  
4 This may overstate somewhat likely future growth in per capita output given the aging of the work force (see 
Benz and Fetzer (2004). If so, we will understate future healthcare expenditures as a share of future GDP.    6 
overstate benefit growth at younger ages and understate it at older ages.  If improvements in 
medical treatments and outcomes make the age-healthcare expenditure profile flatten over 
time, the opposite will be true.
5  In either case, it’s not clear whether our calculated overall 
benefit growth rate will be biased up or down relative to the average we would otherwise be 
calculating with complete data. 
 
III.  Data 
OECD (2004a) reports aggregate annual real public healthcare expenditures, valued at 
1995 prices, for the years 1970 to 2002.  As mentioned, the OECD also provides population 
counts for the eight age groups.  We were able to obtain age-healthcare expenditure profiles 
for each country for either 2000 or 2001 from different academic and governmental sources.  
Data  for  Australia,  Canada,  Germany,  the  UK,  and  the  U.S.  come  from  the  following 
respective government agencies: the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2004), the 
Minister of Public Works  and Government Services Canada  (2001), the German Federal 
Insurance  Authority  (2003),  the  United  Kingdom  Department  of  Health  (2002)  and  the 
Centers  for  Medicaid  and  Medicare  Services  (2003).    Austria’s  profile  comes  from 
Hofmarcher and Riedel (2002).  Japan’s profile comes from Fukawa and Izumida (2004).  
These authors also generated profiles for earlier years and conclude that the age-specific 
distribution of Japanese public health expenditure did not change significantly over the past 
decade.    Norway’s  profile  comes  from  Fetzer,  Grasdal,  and  Raffelhüschen  (2005)  who 
analyze the Norwegian health sector within a Generational Accounting framework.  Profiles 
for Spain and Sweden are based on the work of Catalán., et. al. (2005) and Ekman (2002), 
respectively.  
 
                                                
5 There is a growing literature on how medical advancements will affect healthcare spending at different ages 
and for different cohorts.  See, for example, Buchner and Wasem (2004), Breyer and Felder (2004), Zweifel, 
Felder and Meiers (1999), Zweifel, Felder and Werblow (2004), Stearns and Norton (2004), and Miller (2001).   7 
Age-Relative Expenditure Profiles 
Figure  1  and  table  2  present  our  age-relative  expenditure  profiles.    The  profiles 
decline with age at young ages.  This reflects the costs of birth, vaccinations, infant care, and 
other treatments for young children.  From age group 15-19 on, all profiles rise.
6  At older 
ages the slope of the profiles varies significantly across countries.  In Austria, Germany, 
Spain, and Sweden, expenditures per head on those 75-79 and 80 plus are only twice the level 
of expenditures per head of the reference age group (50 to 64 years).  At the other extreme, 
we have the U.S., where the oldest old receive benefits that average 8 to 12 times those 
received by members of the reference group.  In between these two extremes we have Japan, 
Norway, the UK, Canada, and Australia, where the relative spending factors for the old range 
from 4 to 8. 
Unlike the other countries, the U.S. government does not provide healthcare to the 
entire population.
7  Instead, it covers the lion’s share of the healthcare costs of the very poor 
and of those over 65.  It does this through its Medicaid and Medicare programs.
8  Medicare 
participants are primarily 65 and older, while Medicaid participants are primarily younger 
than 65.  Hence, the shape of the age-government healthcare expenditure profile for the U.S. 
reflects, to a large extent, the fact that Medicaid covers a relatively small fraction of the 
population at any age, and certainly under 65, whereas Medicare covers everyone 65 and 
over.  Stated differently, for age groups under 65, the average values of government health 
expenditures  used  to  form  the  U.S.  profile  are  averages  over  the  entire  population  at  a 
particular age, including those not eligible for Medicaid and, therefore, receiving no benefits.  
                                                
6 In some of our profiles in figure 2 this is not the case. This is due to the structure of the reported data in some 
countries which is stated not per cohort but also per age group, sometimes very large ones (0 to 19 years). In 
such cases, the profile is flat for the first two age groups. 
7 Strictly speaking, Germany has no universal health insurance scheme. However, all but 10 percent of the 
population are insured by statute.  Of those not statutorily insured, the largest group consists of civil servants 
whose “private” insurance plan is financed in large part by the government. 
8 For a detailed description of the U.S. public health insurance scheme see Iglehart (1999a, 1999b, 1999c).   8 
If we consider the age-health expenditure profile simply of those over 65, we find the 
U.S. still spending a relatively large amount on the very old, but not dramatically more than 
several other countries.  For example, the ratio of age 75-79 to age 65-69 average healthcare 
expenditure is 1.7 in the U.S. and 1.8 in the UK.  That said, the fact that the U.S. profile is so 
steeply inclined compared to other countries and that so many people will be moving into the 
older age groups augers for very rapid overall healthcare expenditure growth in the U.S.  
 
Population Projections 
Our  population  projections  incorporate  age-specific  mortality  rates,  age-specific 
fertility rates, net immigrations rates, initial age distributions of the population, age-specific 
net immigration rates, and assumptions concerning the future development of these variables.  
These country-specific data come from the website of the national statistic office or census 
bureau  of  the  country  in  question  as  well  as  from  the  websites  of  Eurostat  and  of  the 
Population Division of the UN.  Our projections differ only slightly from the medium variant 
projections of the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of 
the United Nations Secretariat (2005). 
 
IV. Findings 
Tables 3 and 4 compare real levels and real growth rates of per capita government 
healthcare expenditures, benefits, and per capita GDP over our sample period.  The benefit 
growth rates in table 3 are calculated assuming no measurement error in aggregate health 
expenditures.  A quick glance at columns 3, 6, and 9 in table 3 shows two things.  First, 
growth in per capita healthcare expenditures significantly outpaced growth in per capita GDP 
in all ten of our OECD countries.  Second, the growth rate of benefit levels is very close to 
the growth rate of per capita expenditures in each country, indicating that growth in benefit   9 
levels (benefits at a given age), rather than changes in the age composition of the population 
or the fraction of the population  eligible for benefits  is primarily responsible  for overall 
growth in expenditures per capita.  Table 4 indicates that government healthcare expenditures 
now represent from 5.45 percent to 8.56 percent of GDP in the ten countries.   
In  1970  Sweden  recorded  the  highest  level  of  per  capita  government  healthcare 
spending, namely $940 measured in 2002 dollars.  Norway’s government, in contrast, spent 
almost one third less per person in that year.  But by 2002, Norway’s per capita expenditures 
totaled $3,366, surpassing Sweden’s 2002 $2,128 amount by almost three fifths.  This change 
reflects  Norway’s much higher benefit  growth  rate.   Over the 32  year  period, Norway’s 
benefit level grew at an annual real rate of 5.04 percent, whereas Sweden’s real benefit level 
grew at only 2.35 percent per year.   
Norway recorded the highest growth in benefit levels over the period followed by 
Spain with a growth rate of 4.63 percent and the U.S. with a growth rate of 4.61 percent.   A 
second set of countries -- Australia, Austria, Germany, Japan, and the UK – registered lower, 
but still very high, benefit growth rates, ranging from 3.30 percent to 3.72 percent.  The 
remaining two countries –Canada and Sweden – had comparatively modest benefit growth 
rates, equaling 2.32 percent and 2.35 percent, respectively.  The fact that Canada and Sweden 
appear at the bottom of the benefit growth ranking is not surprising given Canada’s and 
Sweden’s use of rationing to limit healthcare spending.
9 
Figure 2 compares growth in real per capita expenditures and real benefit levels in 
Japan and the U.S.  The figure normalizes per capita expenditures and benefit levels by their 
respective 1970 values.  Since Japan aged much more rapidly than did the U.S. during this 
period, one might expect per capital healthcare expenditures to have grown more rapidly in 
                                                
9 See for the Swedish situation for example Svenska Kommunförbundet (2004) and for the Canadian FN 26.   10 
Japan.
10  But the reverse is true thanks to the much higher benefit growth rate recorded in the 
U.S. 
What  explains  the  high  rates  of  benefit  growth  in  these  countries?  The  health 
economics  literature  connects  benefit  growth  to  costly  product  innovations.
11    A  good 
example here is Spain’s acquisition of CT scanners.  As reported in OECD (2004a), Spain 
had only 1.6 CT scanners per one million inhabitants in 1984 compared with 11 per million 
in the U.S.  By 2001 Spain had 12.3 CT scanners per one million inhabitants vs. 12.8 in the 
U.S.
12 Japan also expanded its use of medical technology over the 32 year period.  Indeed, 
Japan appears to now have the largest number of CTs of any developed country.
13   
Of course, technology doesn’t arise spontaneously.  It is acquired, and at considerable 
cost.  The willingness of developed economies to pay larger shares of income for advanced 
medical technology as well as medications suggests that health is a “luxury good,” with an 
income elasticity greater than one.
14  If this is all the case, our estimator for  l , the growth 
parameter from equation (4), should be significantly larger than average GDP growth of the 
respective country.  This, indeed, is the case.  The income elasticity formed by taking the 
ratio of the benefit growth rates in column 6 of table 3 to the per capita GDP growth rates in 
column 9 range from 1.14 in Canada to 2.29 in the U.S.  On average, this elasticity equals 
1.73.  
Table 5 indicates the share of total  benefit growth  over the 32  year period  that’s 
attributable  to  demographics.    The  table’s  first  three  columns  present  total  healthcare 
                                                
10 According to the OECD, the ratio of the Japanese population 65 years and older to the population under 65 
tripled over our sample period. 
11 See Newhouse (1992) and Zweifel (2003). 
12 The number for this year is not reported for Australia. The most recent Australian number in OECD (2004a) 
is 20.8 CT scanners per one million inhabitants in 1995. This comparatively high number is probably due to 
Australia’s special geographic situation. 
13 See also Reinhardt, Hussey and Anderson (2002) for this point. 
14 For  a  discussion  and  an  overview  about  several  studies  concerning  income  elasticities  of  heatlhcare 
expenditures, see Roberts (1999).   11 
expenditure growth rates, total healthcare expenditure growth rates absent growth in benefit 
levels, and overall GDP growth rates.  The last two columns present ratios of healthcare 
expenditure growth rates to GDP growth rates with and without benefit growth.   
Total real healthcare expenditure growth averaged 4.89 percent per year across the ten 
countries.  Had there been no growth in benefits, this average would have equalled only 1.23 
percent.  Hence, three quarters of healthcare expenditure growth can be traced to growth in 
benefit levels.    
During the same period that healthcare spending was growing at 4.89 percent per year 
in these ten countries, real GDP was also growing, just not as rapidly.  The average annual 
real GDP growth rate growth averaged 2.87 percent.  On average, the rate of healthcare 
growth exceeded the rate of GDP growth by a factor of 1.70.  Absent benefit growth, this 
factor would have equalled only .42.   
As the first column of Table 5 records, the U.S. clocked the highest annual average 
real growth rate of aggregate benefits at 6.23 percent per year.  This growth rate is 2.01 times 
the corresponding 3.10 percent GDP growth rate.  Had U.S. benefit levels not grown, U.S. 
government healthcare spending would not have grown twice as fast as the economy, but 
only half as fast.  In addition to the U.S., Norway, Spain, Australia, and Spain all recorded 
growth rates of total real health expenditures in excess of 5 percent per year.  Among all ten 
countries, Sweden had the most success in keeping healthcare spending from growing faster 
than the economy.  But even in Sweden growth in healthcare spending outpaced growth in 
output by a factor of 1.45.   
 
 
   12 
Accounting for Measurement Error 
Up  to  this  point  we’ve  treated  our  aggregate  expenditure  data  as  free  of  any 
reporting/measurement error.  This may not be the case.  Hence we now turn to estimatingl  
based on equation (5), rather than simply calculating it.  Hansen and King (1996) show that 
health expenditure time series may not be stationary.  So before estimating  l  we test our 
dependent  variable  for  stationarity  using  the  Augmented-Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  and  the 
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests.  This analysis is preformed separately for every country.
15  Test 
statistics are reported in Table 6.  Except for the cases of Canada and Sweden, the time series 
are trend-stationary, and we can estimate l  by OLS without any spurious interference. 
Another potential problem is autocorrelation, which we address by using alternative 
techniques for estimating  l .  As indicated in tables 7 and 8, these techniques are Prais-
Winsten-estimation, Cochrane-Orcutt-estimation, and Maximum Likelihood estimation.  For 
some countries we use a non-linear estimation approach where we include the autocorrelation 
error term in the estimation.  This is necessary because some of the time series seem to have 
moving average autocorrelation disturbances.
16 
Our largest  estimated benefit growth rate, assuming measurement error,  is that of 
Norway with 5.0 percent, followed by Spain with 4.7 percent, and the U.S. with 4.5 percent.  
As  in  the  previous  section  this  could  be  considered  as  the  high-growth-group.    In  the 
medium-growth-group with Australia, Austria, Germany, Japan and the UK  l  ranges from 
3.3  percent  (UK  and  Germany)  over  3.6  percent  (Japan  and  Australia)  to  3.8  percent 
                                                
15 See Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988). As independent variable we only have time, so 
only the regressand has to be tested. 
16 For an overview about these techniques see Greene (2003), Chapter 12.   13 
(Austria). Canada and Sweden make up the low-growth-group with  l  around 2.3 percent.
17  
All estimated parameters are highly significant. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
How sensitive are our estimated benefit growth rates to the shapes of the age-benefit 
profiles shown in figure 1? This question is important, given that classification of health 
expenditures  by age may differ across countries.
18  One  way to  examine  this issue is to 
calculate benefit growth rates using an “average” profile.  To produce such a profile, we 
estimated a polynomial using relative benefits by age for nine of our ten countries.  We 
excluded the U.S. because it has no universal public health insurance system.   
Figure  3  shows  the  estimated  polynomial’s  fitted  values.    Table  9  compares  the 
benefit  growth  rates  implied  by  this  polynomial  age-benefit  profile  if  one  assumes  that 
aggregate health expenditures are measured without error.  As is clear from column 3, the use 
of this alternative profile does not materially alter calculated benefit growth rates.  Indeed, the 
difference in computed growth rates differs at most by 0.3 percentage points.  Take Australia, 
for example.  Its value of l  is 3.66 percent using its own profile and 3.60 percent using the 
“average” profile.  Spain has the biggest difference.  Its calculated growth rate falls from 4.63 
percent to 4.32 percent.  Remarkably, even the U.S. calculated benefit growth rater remains 
largely unchanged in using what for the U.S. is clearly the wrong profile.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Note that the regression results for Canada and Sweden may be spurious because the regressand is I(1) in both 
cases. However, the t-values of the estimated coefficient are 9.2 for Canada and 6.4 for Sweden, which are 
relatively high. 
18 See Reinhardt, Hussey and Anderson (2002).   14 
Changes Over Time in Age-Benefit Profiles 
As indicated, we are using quite recent profiles because earlier profiles are generally 
not available.  An exception here is Canada, where data are available to construct age-benefit 
profiles for each year from 1980 through 2000.  Figure 4 graphs these profiles, and table 10 
presents the values of five of them.  There is variation over time in the shape of the profile, 
but no clear trend.  In 1980 average benefits for Canadians 85 plus were 14.4 times larger 
than Canadians age 50-64.  This relation peaks in 1988 at a 16 to 1 ratio and then falls to a 
ratio of 14.3 to 1 in 2000.
19  Use of any of these profiles does not materially alter our estimate 
of Canada’s benefit growth rate. 
 
IV. Who’s Going Broke? 
Table  11 examines  the  present  value  budgetary  implications  of  permitting  benefit 
levels to continue to grow at historic rates.  For reference, the second column presents 2002 
healthcare spending as a share of 2002 GDP.  The remaining columns show, for different 
discount  rates,  the  present  values  of  projected  future  healthcare  spending  relative  to  the 
present value of GDP.  The four sets of columns assume that benefit levels grow at historic 
rates (see column 7 of table 3) for the number of years indicated at the top of the columns and 
then grow at the same rate as per capita GDP (see the last column of table 3).   We consider 
real discount rates of 3, 5, and 7 percent.  A 3 percent discount rate may be most appropriate 
given the low prevailing rates of long-term inflation indexed bonds in the U.S. and abroad.  
On the other hand, the spending streams being discounted are uncertain, which suggests using 
a higher discount rate to adjust for risk.  
 
                                                
19 Walker and Wilson (2001) and Naylor (1992) show that waiting times for certain treatments in Canada have 
changed through time, which, presumably, accounts in part for changes over time in the age-benefit profile.   15 
Consider first columns 3-5 -- the case that benefit growth is immediately stabilized.  
Under this assumption Canada and Germany have the largest present value costs when scaled 
by the present value of GDP. The reasons are three.  First, both countries have relatively high 
current benefits, which they provide to their entire populations.  Second, both countries are 
slated to age very significantly.  And third, and most important, both countries have very 
steep age-benefit profile.   
Next consider the size of scaled healthcare costs if benefit levels continue to grow at 
historic rates for 40 years.  In this case, the U.S. has the highest scaled costs for discount rates 
of 3 and 5 percent.  At a 7 percent discount rate, Norway takes first place.  Interestingly, 
Austria turns out to be the low scaled present value cost country at each discount rate.  At a 3 
percent discount rate, Austria’s cost is 9.48 percent of future GDP.  This is much lower than, 
for example, Germany’s 14.99 percent cost figure.  Since Austria and Germany have very 
similar demographics, historic benefit growth rates, and age-benefit profiles, what explains 
the difference? The answer is that Austria has a significantly higher historic growth rate of 
per capita GDP.  Hence, the denominator in Austria’s cost rate – the present value of future 
GDP – is relatively high compared to that of Germany.  
At  a 3  percent discount rate, the U.S. is  projected  to spend  18.85 cents of  every 
present dollar the country produces on its two healthcare programs – Medicare and Medicaid.  
At a 7 percent discount rate, the figure is 14.98 cents on the present value dollar.  Given that 
the U.S. government is now spending 6.57 percent of GDP, this projection implies a huge 
additional fiscal burden on the American public.  Norway is in similar shape in terms of its 
healthcare costs, but Norway does not have to bear the burden of paying for a large military.  
In addition, it has significant oil wealth to help cover its costs.   
The comparison  between Japan and the U.S.  is quite interesting.   At a  3 percent 
discount rate Japan’s costs are 12.95 percent of future GDP compared with 18.85 percent.  At   16 
a 7 percent discount rate the respective figures are 10.17 percent and 12.51 percent.  How can 
the U.S. have so much higher present value costs when Japan is already so old and will end 
up much older than the U.S. will end up? The answer is that Japan has a lower benefit growth 
rate, a higher per capita GDP growth rate, and a much flatter age-benefit profile.    
Turn next to the 20-year benefit growth figures.  In the case of the U.S., for example, 
letting benefit grow at historic rates for just 20 years leads to a 13.24 percent cost at a 3 
percent discount rate.  This figure is quite high on its own and also quite high relative to the 
18.85 percent cost that arises with 40 years of benefit growth.  The message then is that 
letting  benefits  grow  at  historic  rates  even  on  a  relatively  short-term  basis  is  extremely 
expensive.  It locks in high benefit levels for years and generations to come.   
Finally, consider the 60 benefit growth scenario.  In this case, at a 3 percent discount 
rate, the U.S. ends up spending 26.42 cents of every present dollar the economy generates on 
its government healthcare programs.  Not far behind are Norway, which spends 22.99 cents, 
Germany, which spends 17.44 cents, and Australia, which spends 17.15 cents.  The lowest 
costs, again, are those of Austria, which spends 11.05 cents.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Growth since 1970 in aggregate healthcare spending by our ten OECD governments 
reflects first and foremost growth in benefit levels (healthcare spending at any given age).  
Indeed, three quarters of overall healthcare expenditure growth and virtually all of growth in 
healthcare expenditure per capita reflect growth in benefit levels.  Although OECD countries 
are projected to age dramatically, growth in benefit levels, if it continues apace, will remain 
the major determinant of overall healthcare spending growth.     17 
The very rapid growth in benefit levels documented here is clearly unsustainable.  No 
country can spend an ever rising share of its output on healthcare.  Benefit growth must 
eventually fall in line with growth in per capita income.  The real question is not if, but when, 
healthcare benefit growth will slow down.  Raising benefit levels is one thing.  Cutting them 
is another.  If OECD governments spend the next three decades expanding benefit levels at 
their historic rates, the fiscal repercussions will be enormous.   
The  fiscal  fallout  is  likely  to  be  particularly  severe  for  the  United  States.    Like 
Norway and Spain, its benefit growth has been extremely high.  But unlike Norway, Spain, 
and other OECD countries, the U.S. appears to lack both the institutional mechanism and 
political will to control its healthcare spending.  America’s elderly are politically very well 
organized, and each cohort of retirees has, since the 1950s, used its political power to extract 
ever greater transfers from contemporaneous workers.  The recently legislated Medicare drug 
benefit is a case in point.  Although the present value costs of this transfer payment is roughly 
$10 trillion, not a penny of these costs is slated to be paid for by the current elderly.    
There is, of course, a limit to how much a government can extract from the young to 
accommodate  the  old.    When  that  limit  is  reached,  governments  go  broke.    Of  the  ten 
countries considered here, the U.S. appears the most likely to hit this limit.     18 
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Figure 1 – Healthcare Benefit Age Profiles 
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Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2004), own 
calculations 
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Source: Hofmarcher and Riedel (2002), own calculations 
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Source: Minister of Public Works and Government Services 
Canada (2001), own calculations 
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Source: German Federal Insurance Authority (2003), own 
calculations   22 
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Source: Fukawa and Izumida (2004), own calculations 
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Source: Fetzer, Grasdal and Raffelhüschen (2005), own 
calculations 
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Source: Catalán et al. (2005), own calculations 
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Source: Ekman. (2002), own calculations   23 
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Source: Department of health UK (2002), own calculations 
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Table 1 
Elderly Share of the Population 
(percent) 
 
Country  2002  2030  2050  2070 
Australia  12.2  20.4  24.0  25.2 
Austria  15.5  24.4  29.1  31.1 
Canada  13.0  23.6  26.7  27.1 
Germany  17.1  26.3  30.6  31.3 
Japan  18.0  29.9  36.8  37.7 
Norway  15.1  21.0  23.6  24.5 
Spain  16.2  24.2  34.0  30.0 
Sweden  17.2  25.5  28.5  29.3 
UK  15.9  22.9  26.1  27.3 
US  12.4  19.1  21.3  21.6 
Average  14.8  22.6  25.9  25.6 
      Source: United Nations (2005) 
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Table 2 
 
Healthcare Benefit-Age Profiles 
 
 
  0 – 14  15-19  20 – 49  50 – 64  65 – 69  70 – 74  75 – 79  80 + 
Australia  0.60  0.57  0.64  1.00  1.81  2.16  3.90  4.23 
Austria  0.28  0.28  0.46  1.00  1.42  1.75  1.98  2.17 
Canada  0.43  0.61  0.65  1.00  2.45  2.44  4.97  7.54 
Germany  0.48  0.43  0.58  1.00  1.52  1.80  2.11  2.48 
Japan  0.44  0.22  0.43  1.00  1.70  2.20  2.76  3.53 
Norway  0.57  0.34  0.52  1.00  1.70  2.21  2.69  3.41 
Spain  0.57  0.39  0.48  1.00  1.46  1.73  1.97  2.11 
Sweden  0.43  0.43  0.63  1.00  1.50  1.50  1.96  1.99 
United 
Kingdom 
1.08  0.65  0.76  1.00  2.07  2.07  3.67  4.65 
United 
States 
0.88  0.82  0.77  1.00  5.01  5.02  8.52  11.53   26 
Table 3 
  
Per Capita Healthcare Expenditures, Benefit Levels, and Per Capita GDP, 1970 and 2002  
 
(2002 U.S. Dollars) 
 
 
1970  
Per Capita 
Expenditure  
2002  
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Annualized 
Growth 
Rate 
1970 
Benefit 
Level   
2002 
Benefit 
Level   
Annualized 
Growth 
Rate 
1970  
Per Capita 
GDP   
2002  
Per Capita 
GDP   
Annualized 
Growth 
Rate 
Australia  $362  $1,323  4.13%  $428  $1,351  3.66%  $11,916  $20,813  1.76% 
Austria  $393  $1,375  3.99%  $587  $1,890  3.72%  $11,830  $25,570  2.44% 
Canada  $589  $1,552  3.08%  $647  $1,350  2.32%  $12,073  $23,072  2.04% 
Germany  $663  $2,066  3.62%  $842  $2,377  3.30%  $14,804  $24,143  1.54% 
Japan  $457  $2,082  4.85%  $741  $2,274  3.57%  $14,419  $31,194  2.44% 
Norway  $645  $3,366  5.30%  $772  $3,722  5.04%  $16,032  $42,032  3.06% 
Spain  $175  $855  5.08%  $252  $1,074  4.63%  $7,477  $15,688  2.34% 
Sweden  $940  $2,128  2.59%  $1,192  $2,511  2.35%  $15,833  $26,994  1.68% 
UK  $528  $1,694  3.71%  $466  $1,383  3.46%  $13,474  $26,298  2.11% 
US  $481  $2,364  5.10%  $334  $1,415  4.61%  $19,076  $36,006  2.01% 
Average  $523  $1,880  4.14%  $626  $1,935  3.67%  $13,693  $27,181  2.14%   27 
 
Table 4   
Per Capita Government Healthcare Expenditures and Per Capita GDP, 1970 and 2002  
 
(2002 U.S. Dollars) 
 
 
1970  
Per Capita 
Expenditure  
1970  
Per Capita 
GDP 
1970 Per Capita 
Expenditure as 
Percent of 1970 
Per Capita GDP 
2002  
Per Capita 
Expenditure  
2002  
Per Capita 
GDP 
2002 Per Capita 
Expenditure as a 
Percent of 1970 
Per Capita GDP 
Australia  $362  $11,916  3.04%  $1,323  $20,813  6.36% 
Austria  $393  $11,830  3.32%  $1,375  $25,570  5.38% 
Canada  $589  $12,073  4.88%  $1,552  $23,072  6.73% 
Germany  $663  $14,804  4.48%  $2,066  $24,143  8.56% 
Japan  $457  $14,419  3.17%  $2,082  $31,194  6.67% 
Norway  $645  $16,032  4.02%  $3,366  $42,032  8.01% 
Spain  $175  $7,477  2.34%  $855  $15,688  5.45% 
Sweden  $940  $15,833  5.94%  $2,128  $26,994  7.88% 
UK  $528  $13,474  3.92%  $1,694  $26,298  6.44% 
US  $481  $19,076  2.52%  $2,364  $36,006  6.57%   28 
Figure 2  
 
Comparing Benefit Levels and Per Capita Healthcare Expenditures  
 
in Japan and the U.S., 1970-2002 
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Table 5 
 
Annual Growth Rates of Real Government Healthcare Expenditures and Real GDP, 1970-2002 
 
Country 
Real Healthcare 
Expenditure 
Growth Rate 
Real Healthcare 
Expenditure Growth 
Rate Absent Growth 
in Benefit Levels 
Real GDP Growth 
Rate 
Ratio of Healthcare 
Expenditure Growth  
Rate to GDP 
Growth Rate 
Ratio of Healthcare 
Expenditure Growth 
Rate Absent Growth 
in Benefit Levels to 
GDP Growth Rate 
Australia  5.61%  1.96%  3.21%  1.75  0.61 
Austria  4.23%  0.51%  2.68%  1.58  0.19 
Canada  4.28%  1.96%  3.23%  1.32  0.61 
Germany  4.62%  1.32%  2.52%  1.83  0.52 
Japan  5.50%  1.94%  3.07%  1.79  0.63 
Norway  5.82%  0.78%  3.57%  1.63  0.22 
Spain  5.79%  1.16%  3.03%  1.91  0.38 
Sweden  2.92%  0.57%  2.01%  1.45  0.28 
UK  3.91%  0.45%  2.31%  1.69  0.20 
US  6.23%  1.61%  3.10%  2.01  0.52 
Average  4.89%  1.23%  2.87%  1.70  0.42 
  Source: OECD (2004a), own calculations   30 
Table 6 
 
Unit Root Test Statistics (ADF and PP) 
 
Country  Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
(ADF) Value 
Phillips-Perron-Test (PP) 
Value 
Australia  -3.23 (1)
* [Trend & Intercept]  -3.02 [Trend & Intercept] 
Austria  -3.05 (0)
** [Intercept]  -3.00
** [Intercept] 
Canada  -2.40 (0) [Intercept]  -2.19 [Intercept] 
Germany  -4.00 (0)
** [Trend & Intercept]  -4.75
*** [Trend & Intercept] 
Japan  -3.01 (0)
** [Intercept]  -3.35
** [Intercept] 
Norway  -3.52 (0)
* [Trend & Intercept]  -3.73
** [Trend & Intercept] 
Spain  -3.47 (1)
* [Trend & Intercept]  -3.41
* [Trend & Intercept] 
Sweden  -1.86 (0) [Intercept]  -1.72 [Intercept] 
UK  -3.24 (1)
* [Trend & Intercept]  -2.4 [Trend & Intercept] 
US  -4.34 (0)
*** [Trend & Intercept]  -2.14 [Trend & Intercept] 
*,** and *** indicate the probability of error of 1%, 5% and respectively 10 %. The number 
in brackets in case of the ADF test stands for the number of lagged differences. See Dickey 
and Fuller (1979). 
   31 
Table 7  
 
Estimated Benefit Growth Rates  
 
 
 
No 
Measurement 
Error 
OLS  Prais-Winsten  Cochrane-
Orcutt 
Maximum-
Likelihood 
ARMA(1,1)-
Disturbances 
Australia  3.66%  3.61%  3.57%  3.58%  3.58%  X 
Austria  3.72%  4.36%  3.77%  3.77%  3.88%  X 
Canada  2.32%  2.46%  2.32%  2.32%  2.33%  2.37% 
Germany  3.30%  3.76%  3.29%  3.29%  3.38%  X 
Japan  3.57%  3.87%  3.53%  3.54%  3.57%  X 
Norway  5.04%  5.05%  4.91%  4.91%  4.92%  X 
Spain  4.63%  5.26%  4.57%  4.57%  4.52%  4.62% 
Sweden  2.35%  2.28%  2.28%  2.29%  2.28%  2.31% 
UK  3.46%  3.17%  3.21%  3.21%  3.21%  X 
US  4.61%  4.46%  4.44%  4.44%  4.43%  4.46% 
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Table 8 
Estimation Details 
 
OLS (N=33) 
  AUT  A  CDN  D  J  N  E  S  UK  US 
ln( ) l   0.0361 
(0.001)*** 
0.0436 
(0.002)*** 
0.0246 
(0.001)*** 
0.0376 
(0.001)*** 
0.0387 
(0.001)*** 
0.0505 
(0.001)*** 
0.0526 
(0.002)*** 
0.0228 
(0.001)*** 
0.0317 
(0.001)*** 
0.0446 
(0.003)*** 
R
2 
(adj) 
0.9769  0.9595  0.9685  0.9595  0.9798  0.9795  0.9653  0.9309  0.9932  0.9984 
DW  0.3973  0.1172  0.1245  0.0865  0.1002  0.1528  0.0779  0.0798  0.3611  0.2193 
Prais-Winsten (N=33) 
  AUT  A  CDN  D  J  N  E  S  UK  US 
ln( ) l   0.0357 
(0.003)*** 
0.0377 
(0.006)*** 
0.0232 
(0.003)*** 
0.0329 
(0.005)*** 
0.0353 
(0.004)*** 
0.0491 
(0.004)*** 
0.0457 
(0.007)*** 
0.0228 
(0.004)*** 
0.0321 
(0.001)*** 
0.0444 
(0.001)*** 
R
2 
(adj) 
0.8628  0.5253  0.6932  0.5556  0.7356  0.8085  0.5860  0.5441  0.9559  0.9886 
DW  1.5996  1.4230  1.2849  1.6962  1.5824  1.7085  0.9675  1.3113  1.4202  0.6900 
Cochrane-Orcutt (N=32) 
  AUT  A  CDN  D  J  N  E  S  UK  US 
ln( ) l   0.0358 
(0.003)*** 
0.0377 
(0.006)*** 
0.0232 
(0.003)*** 
0.0329 
(0.005)*** 
0.0354 
(0.004)*** 
0.0491 
(0.004)*** 
0.0457 
(0.007)*** 
0.0229 
(0.004)*** 
0.0321 
(0.001)*** 
0.0444 
(0.001)*** 
R
2 
(adj) 
0.8628  0.5266  0.6943  0.5563  0.7373  0.8095  0.5867  0.5438  0.9561  0.9894 
DW  1.5994  1.4226  1.2846  1.6958  1.5817  1.7080  0.9673  1.3113  1.4210  0.6893   33 
Maximum-Likelihood (N=33) 
  AUT  A  CDN  D  J  N  E  S  UK  US 
ln( ) l   0.0358 
(0.002)*** 
0.0388 
(0.005)*** 
0.0233 
(0.002)*** 
0.0338 
(0.004)*** 
0.0357 
(0.003)*** 
0.0492 
(0.004)*** 
0.0452 
(0.008)*** 
0.0228 
(0.003)*** 
0.0321 
(0.001)*** 
0.0443 
(0.001)*** 
AR(1) 
0.7818 
(0.107)*** 
0.9723 
(0.065)*** 
0.9247 
(0.063)*** 
0.9355 
(0.056)*** 
0.9411 
(0.057)*** 
0.9071 
(0.068)*** 
0.9872 
(0.038)*** 
0.9413 
(0.484)*** 
0.8077 
(0.101)*** 
0.8891 
(0.075)*** 
LogL  43.54  45.98  68.27  55.75  63.73  48.73  48.47  64.29  69.38  89.20 
ARMA(1,1)-Disturbances (N=32) 
  AUT  A  CDN  D  J  N  E  S  UK  US 
ln( ) l   X  X 
0.0237 
(0.003)*** 
X  X  X 
0.0462 
(0.011)*** 
0.0231 
(0.004)*** 
X 
0.0446 
(0.001)*** 
AR(1)  X  X 
0.8858 
(0.090)*** 
X  X  X 
0.9568 
(0.082)*** 
0.9160 
(0.076)*** 
X 
0.7396 
(0.118)*** 
MA(1)  X  X 
0.7068 
(0.108)*** 
X  X  X 
0.4551 
(0.167)** 
0.5752 
(0.157)*** 
X 
0.9557 
(0.031)*** 
R
2 
(adj)  X  X  0.9815  X  X  X  0.9804  0.9595  X  0.9991 
DW  X  X  2.1151  X  X  X  1.7886  2.1895  X  1.8890 
*,** and *** indicate the probability of error of 1%, 5% and respectively 10 %. In the ARMA(1,1) case the disturbance is estimated as follows: 
1 1 t t t t u u r q e e - - = ´ + ´ + .  t e are iid N(0,￿2). 
 
Australia  AUT  Canada  CDN  Japan  J  Spain  E  United Kingdom  UK 
Austria  A  Germany  D  Norway  N  Sweden  S  United States  US   34 
Figure 3 – Polynomial estimation 
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The curve is estimated as  2 0.28 0.05agegroup +  while  agegroup is measured discretionary 
from 1 to 8.   35 
Table 9 
  
Benefit Level Growth Rates 
 
Country  Original Profiles  Polynominal  Difference 
(percentage points) 
Australia  3.66%  3.60%  0.06 
Austria  3.72%  3.65%  0.07 
Canada  2.32%  2.46%  -0.14 
Germany  3.30%  3.17%  0.13 
Japan  3.57%  3.83%  -0.26 
Norway  5.04%  4.97%  0.07 
Spain  4.63%  4.32%  0.31 
Sweden  2.35%  2.20%  0.15 
United Kingdom  3.46%  3.35%  0.11 
United States  4.61%  4.71%  -0.10 
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Table 10 
 
Canadian Age-Benefit Profiles 
 
  0 – 14  15-24  25 – 34  35 – 44  45 – 54  55 – 64  65 – 74  75 – 84  85 + 
1980  0.61  0.66  0.80  0.78  1.00  1.49  2.97  6.47  14.39 
1985  0.61  0.70  0.83  0.78  1.00  1.53  3.22  6.89  15.76 
1990  0.61  0.74  0.84  0.79  1.00  1.56  3.39  6.96  15.09 
1995  0.57  0.78  0.88  0.80  1.00  1.59  3.42  6.85  14.57 
2000  0.56  0.81  0.89  0.80  1.00  1.56  3.25  6.58  14.27 
Source: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada (2001), OECD (2004a), own calculations 
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Figure 4  
 
Canadian Age-Benefit Profiles, 1980 – 2000 
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Table 11 
 
Present Value of Government Healthcare Expenditures as a Share of the Present Value of GDP 
 
 
 
Country  Start 
2002 
Benefit Levels Grow at 
Historic Rate for 0 years 
Benefit Levels Grow at 
Historic Rate for 20 years 
Benefit Levels Grow at 
Historic Rate for 40 years 
Benefit Levels Grow at 
Historic Rate for 60 years 
    R=3%  r=5%  r=7%  r=3%  r=5%  r=7%  r=3%  r=5%  r=7%  r=3%  r=5%  r=7% 
Australia  6.36%  8.45%  7.75%  7.34%  10.73%  9.63%  8.92%  13.71%  11.59%  10.22%  17.15%  13.35%  11.13% 
Austria  5.38%  6.81%  6.38%  6.09%  8.02%  7.39%  6.95%  9.48%  8.34%  7.58%  11.05%  9.12%  7.99% 
Canada  6.73%  10.85%  9.54%  8.72%  11.27%  9.88%  9.00%  11.73%  10.18%  9.20%  12.16%  10.40%  9.31% 
Germany  8.56%  10.19%  9.74%  9.45%  12.47%  11.67%  11.10%  14.99%  13.32%  12.21%  17.44%  14.54%  12.84% 
Japan  6.67%  9.68%  8.86%  8.36%  11.22%  10.12%  9.42%  12.95%  11.24%  10.17%  14.65%  12.07%  10.60% 
Norway  8.01%  9.95%  9.25%  8.83%  12.90%  11.69%  10.89%  17.22%  14.50%  12.75%  22.99%  17.33%  14.19% 
Spain  5.45%  6.67%  6.40%  6.16%  8.89%  8.28%  7.76%  11.91%  10.26%  9.09%  15.61%  12.08%  10.03% 
Sweden  7.88%  8.97%  8.67%  8.48%  9.77%  9.35%  9.07%  10.59%  9.90%  9.44%  11.35%  10.28%  9.64% 
UK  6.44%  8.01%  7.48%  7.17%  9.54%  8.74%  8.24%  11.37%  9.93%  9.02%  13.33%  10.90%  9.52% 
US  6.57%  9.50%  8.38%  7.73%  13.24%  11.35%  10.16%  18.85%  14.98%  12.51%  26.42%  18.82%  14.45% 